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Abstract: Ordinarily labor market equilibrium implies that the marginal worker is 
indifferent to employment, and that the employer is indifferent between equally 
productive employees. When the marginal worker is indifferent to employment, employer 
preferences do not matter. If, however, the marginal worker strictly prefers to be 
employed, the employer can give favors, and may wish to do so even at some cost to 
efficient production. Not only may inefficient workers be employed, but also the 
employer will employ too many workers. We refer to this as the brother-in law effect. 
When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, the employment effect can be 
sufficiently strong that there is over-employment relative to the workforce that would be 
employed without unionization. When the employment effect is strong – because 
brothers-in-law are relatively good workers – this type of nepotism improves efficiency. 
If the employment effect is weak nepotism hurts efficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
Although the assumption that for-profit firms, either public or private, minimize 
costs provides a reasonable benchmark in a myriad of applications, it sometimes becomes 
unpalatable.  Does such an assumption make sense, for instance, when we see a firm 
simultaneously laying off a substantial proportion of its workers yet increasing output? 
This occurred, for example, in Chile when Codelco – a public copper company – faced 
competition from the privately-owned copper mine La Escondida in the late 80s.
3 There 
is also plenty of evidence of x-inefficiency after privatizations – see for example Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994) or Galiani, Gertler, Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger (2005). However, 
inefficiency is not exclusive of public firms; perhaps the best documented case of private 
firm inefficiencies is that of iron ore production in the U.S. midwest found in Galdon-
Sanchez and Schmitz Jr. (2002). 
In these cases, firms appear to employ less than competent workers and employ 
too many of them. This is puzzling for a private firm, as it implies that the hiring 
decisions are not profit maximizing. But it is also puzzling in the public sector, for it 
implies that more services and transfers could be provided with the same budget, or that 
taxes could be cut without affecting the current level of services and transfers, whereby 
the ruling party could attract more support.  
The goal of this paper is to examine whether the presence of less than competent 
workers and over-employment can be explained by nepotism. Nepotism should be 
understood in the widest possible sense, that is, managers or public officials favoring 
family members, political party comrades, friends or any person from whose gratitude 
they could benefit. We will use the term “brothers-in-law” in figurative reference to the 
class of favored individuals. 
Nepotism may arise from many sources. Perhaps the first to come to mind are 
agency problems: the person in charge of hiring does not bear the cost of having 
incompetent workers while still benefits, say, from his political party's gratitude.   
Presumably, however, there are other ways in which the agent can appropriate his 
informational rents (for example, by simply charging a higher wage) and it is by no 
means obvious why he would choose this one in particular.  The idea put forward in this 
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paper is that when for some extraneous reason the firm is forced to pay wages above the 
marginal worker's reservation wage (we refer to this as a wage gap), giving the agent the 
ability to hire brothers-in-law could in fact be the cheapest way for the principal to pay 
for the informational rent. 
Suppose that there is such a gap and the agent hires his “brother-in-law”. Then the 
brother-in-law receives a rent from employment, while the cost to the firm is the 
difference between the brother-in-law’s productivity and the going wage.  If this ability to 
hire brothers-in-law is part of an optimal delegation contract, then the cost to the firm will 
be transferred to the agent in terms of expected wage: the agent's compensation would 
consist of his wage and the ability to hire a brother-in-law.  If the brother-in-law is close 
in productivity to the marginal worker, the productivity loss is much smaller than the 
surplus received by the brother-in-law. If the agent finds it in his interest to make this 
favor to his brother-in-law – because of the expectation of future favors, or simply 
because he likes his sister – then he would prefer to hire him even if his expected wage is 
reduced by the productivity differential. If this is the case, meritocracy fails and the firm 
hires the “wrong” workers in that sense, with the end result of output not being produced 
at the lowest cost, that is, x-inefficiency. 
It can readily be seen that this argument holds even in the absence of agency 
problems. If the owner of the firm is forced to pay a wage gap, hiring her own brothers-
in-law means transferring them money on a better than 1-1 basis and costs her just the 
productivity difference. Hence, in order to understand the phenomenon as 
straightforwardly as possible, we will focus on this case. By doing so we do not mean to 
say that the agency problem case is empirically unimportant, but merely that the 
delegation problem per se is not necessary to see most of the issues involved. 
Thus, the key to nepotism lies not in whether the product market is monopolized, 
but rather in circumstances in the labor market – which may or may not be correlated 
with product market monopoly. Specifically, we show that whenever there exists a gap 
between the wage paid to the marginal worker and his reservation wage the incentives for 
nepotism are in place regardless of the cause of that gap. Consequently, the existence of a 
wage gap or rent to the marginal worker makes awarding employment a cheap method to 
the employer of making transfer payments; this private benefit of employing a brother-in-
law can also lead the employer to employ too many workers.   3
When there is competition in the labor market we show that nepotism will not 
occur. When there are labor market frictions – either unionization or moral hazard, we 
show that nepotism is possible. We explore also the consequences for welfare. Under the 
assumption that welfare weights are calibrated so that transfer payments are neutral, we 
find that banning nepotism may lead to a welfare decrease with unionization. Because 
brothers-in-law are cheaper per unit of output for the firm to employ – on account of their 
non-pecuniary benefit outweighing their inefficiency as workers – the firm will produce 
more output with a union of brothers-in-law than a union of normal workers. Hence, 
banning nepotism will reduce output reducing welfare. If brothers-in-law are almost as 
productive as normal workers, this output effect will more than offset the effect of 
replacing inefficient workers with efficient ones, and welfare will decline. If brothers-in-
law are inefficient workers – so that the firm is near indifference between employing 
them and normal workers, then the output effect is small, and welfare is improved by 
banning nepotism. 
Banning nepotism could also lead to a welfare decrease with moral hazard. 
Because it is cheaper to motivate brothers-in-law to induce high effort – again on account 
of their non-pecuniary benefit – the firm will induce high effort hiring a brother-in-law in 
cases where would induce low effort with a normal worker. Hence banning nepotism will 
change the effort reducing welfare. In this case whenever this effect is present it will 
more than offset the effect of replacing an inefficient worker with an efficient one, and 
welfare will decline. 
This paper studies the consequences of the existence of “brothers-in-law” in 
various types of labor markets. As we indicated, by “brothers-in-law” we mean nepotism 
in the widest possible sense. This phenomenon has been studied by Becker (1959), 
Goldberg (1982) and Prendergast and Topel (1996). Becker studies the behavior of 
unions; he finds that when the rents they create are not appropriated by, say, entrance 
fees, nepotism and discrimination are possible outcomes. While his paper is about the 
effect of rents on union behavior, ours is on firm behavior. Goldberg examines how racial 
wage differentials can survive in competitive equilibrium in the long-run and short-run. 
By way of contrast we focus on market frictions, and not on perfect competition; 
Prendergast and Topel examine how favoritism has an impact on the flow of information 
within an organization and can lead to bureaucratic structures.   4
2. The Certainty Model with Unions 
There is a single firm which employs two types of worker: normal workers ( 1 L ) 
and brothers-in-law ( 2 L ). We assume that both sets of would-be workers are large 
enough so that it is always possible to hire more workers of each kind,
4 and all workers 
have the same reservation wage w. 
The brother-in-law is distinguished by being a person whose income figures 
positively into his employer’s utility. This includes such things as managers or public 
officials caring about family members, political party comrades, friends or any person or 
institution who they value, or from whose gratitude they could benefit.  In particular we 
assume that each dollar that a brother-in-law gets increases the utility of the employer by 
( ) 0,1 β ∈ . Note that we assume  1 β < , meaning that the employer will never transfer 
money on a 1-1 basis to the brother-in-law. There is a large literature on altruism – 
discussed for example in Andreoni and Miller (2002) – suggesting that while 1-1 
transfers are not common, many people are willing to make transfers on a better than 1-1 
basis, that is, give up a dollar so that the recipient will receive more than a dollar. Here 
the employer is willing to give up a dollar provided the brother-in-law receives at least 
1/β  dollars. We note also that this model of a brother-in-law assumes that the benefit to 
the employer comes at no cost to the brother-in-law. In many cases – an actual brother-in-
law, the employment of individuals who are already political supporters – this is the right 
assumption. We do not consider the case of “kickbacks” in which the benefit to the 
employer comes at some cost to the brother-in-law. We also suppose that the only 
consumption externality is between the employer and the brother-in-law. 
We assume that the brother-in-law may be a less efficient worker than a normal 
worker: we normalize the labor supply of a normal worker to 1 and assume that the 
brother in law can provide only  1 η ≤  units of labor. The production function for output 
q  is: 
  () 12 qf L L η =+   
where f  is strictly increasing.  
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Let  p  be the output price, and W  the wage paid. In general price is a non-
increasing function of output  () pp q = . The wage Ww ≥  may be greater than the 
reservation value of workers – for example, due to a union contract, or due the presence 
of informational rents in the face of private information. We initially take W  as 
exogenous. Hiring is left to the firm.
5 The objective function for the firm is then 
  {} () () () ()
12 ,, 1 2 2 max LLq pqq WL L W wL β Π= − + + −  
which can be written as  
{} () ( ) ()
12 ,, 1 2 max 1 LLq pqq W L W wL ββ Π= − − − + . 
Define  () * 1 WW w ββ =− +  to be the “perceived” wage paid to brothers-in-law, and 
2 2 LL η =  the productivity-adjusted equivalent labor (in comparison to normal workers) 
of the brothers in law. Thus, the objective function can be thought of as a regular profit 
function: 
  {} () () () 12
*
22 2 ,1 1 1 max LL
W
pfL L fL L W L L
η
⎛⎞ ⎟ ⎜ Π= + + − − ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠
 
where  2 L  and  1 L  are perfect substitutes. 
We assume that the revenue function  (() )() pfL fL is concave in the aggregate 
labor employed L, so that this problem has a unique solution characterized by first-order 
conditions. We further assume that the optimal output is positive. 
3. Employment and Overemployment 
  Our first goal is to study when brothers-in-law will be employed, how many are 
employed. Our ultimate goal is to study the phenomenon of overemployment where more 
workers are employed when there is a wage gap than when there is not. Without the 
brother-in-law effect, a wage gap necessarily reduces employment. With brothers-in-law 
this is no longer the case. 
  We start by determining when brothers-in-law will be employed. 
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If  * ηη >  the firm prefers to hire brothers-in-law; that is, the optimum is 
12 0, 0 LL => , and conversely if  * ηη <  the firm prefers not to hire brothers-in-law; 
that is the optimum is  12 0, 0 LL >= . 
Remark: The importance of this theorem is that as soon as the wage-gap is positive, 
0 Ww −> , then sufficiently productive brothers-in-law will be exclusively employed, 
despite the fact they are less productive than normal workers. An implication of the 
theorem is that a necessary condition for brothers-in-law to be employed is  1 ηβ ≥−.  
Proof: Since  1 L  and  2 L  are perfect substitutes, the firm will prefer to hire brothers-in-law 





⎛⎞ ⎟ ⎜ > ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠
.  
Replacing and solving for η  yields  * ηη > . 
  
  ; 
 
  We next want to consider the impact of the availability of brothers-in-law to the 
firm. That is, we compare the case where brothers-in-law can be hired, to the case where 
they cannot be – perhaps due to laws against nepotism.   
Theorem 3.2: If Ww >  output is higher when the firm hires brothers-in-law than when 
only regular workers are available. 
Proof: If brothers-in-law are preferred but nepotism is banned, the “equivalent cost of 
labor” to the employer would rise from  */ W η  to W , decreasing output. In that sense, 
output is higher when brothers-in-law are available. If  */ W η  were higher than W  
normal workers would have been preferred in the first place (Theorem 3.1), and there 
would have been no nepotism altogether.   
; 
Making available brothers-in-law, then, increases employment. Can it increase 
employment so much that more workers are actually employed than if there was no wage 
gap at all? That is, can the combination of a union and nepotism result in more 
employment than competition?   7
Suppose that  * ηη > , and let  *
2 L  be the optimal number of brothers-in-law 
employed. Let  1
C L  be the optimal number of normal workers employed when there is no 
wage gap, that is, Ww = . By overemployment we mean  *
21
C LL > , that is when the 
wage gap is eliminated, for example, because the union is busted, the number of workers 
employed declines. Note that without the brother-in-law effect, the elimination of a wage 
gap will necessarily increase employment. 
The possibility of overemployment can be shown by considering a simple 
example with linear demand pa b q =−  and constant returns to scale so that suitably 
normalized,  () fL L = .  
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Then there is overemployment if  max{ *, } ηη η η +− >> . 
Remark: The condition is not vacuous. If the reservation wage  0 w =  and the firm cares 
for his brothers-in-law as much as for himself, so that  1, 0, * 0 ηηη +− === , and if the 
brothers-in-law are neither completely unproductive so that  0 η > , nor as productive as 
normal workers so that  1 η < , then certainly  max{ *, } ηη η η +− >> . Since the 
inequality is strict and  ,, * ηηη +−  are continuous functions of the parameters, the 
inequality must continue to hold for small values of w  and values of β  smaller than but 
close to one. 











By way of contrast, if the labor market is perfectly competitive Ww = , so no brothers-
in-law are hired, and     8






Solving for  21 /1 LL =  yields a quadratic in η  with the two positive roots ηη +− > . 
Morover, if η  lies in between the two roots, than it must be that  21 /1 LL > .This implies 
that the condition for overemployment is that η  is between both roots and large enough 
that the firm wishes to hire brothers-in-law, that is,  * ηη > .  
; 
  How well does this result generalize to non-linear demand and non-constant 
marginal cost? We identified the case w  near zero and β  near one as a case in which 
there will be overemployment. This result generalizes. 
Theorem 3.4: For any demand that is not perfectly elastic there exists  0 w >  and 
1 β <  such that if  , ww ββ <>  and  1 η 0< <  there is overemployment. 
Remark: In other words, if altruism β  is high and the ratio of union to competitive wages 
/ Ww  is high, then there will be overemployment. 
Proof: From Theorem 3.1  0 w =  and  1 β =  imply that  * 0 η = . Since demand is not 
perfectly elastic output is determined by the first order condition 
  ( ) ( ) 12 '' ( ) 0 pq q p fL L ηη ++ = . 
This is true regardless of whether or not brothers-in-law are available: if they are 
unavailable,  12 0, 0 LL >= , while if they are available, since  *0 η =   12 0, 0 LL => . 
Since the first order condition holds if and only if q  is chosen to maximize revenue 
() pqq the same output is produced regardless of the availability of brothers-in-law. Since 
output is the same in both cases and since  1 η <  brothers-in-law are less efficient 
workers strictly more brothers-in-law must be employed to attain the target output.  The 
result now follows for  , ww ββ <>  by continuity. 
; 
  Theorem 3.4 rules out elastic demand, that is, the case in which output markets 
are perfectly competitive. We do not have a general result in the competitive case. 
Suppose, however, that the production function is the homogenous Cobb-Douglas 
() fL L α = . In the case of product market monopoly it is of course true that for 
, ww ββ <>  there is overemployment. Strikingly, this cannot happen in the 
competitive case.   9
Theorem 3.5: If demand is competitive  () pq p =  and  () fL L α =  then  *
21
C LL ≤ , that is, 
there cannot be overemployment.  
Proof: In the competitive case we have  
  1
1 / Lp w α α − =  



















− ⎛⎞ ⎟ ⎜ =≥ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠
, 
since  1 η ≤  and  * Ww ≥ . 
; 
4. Efficiency 
Finally, we examine the issue of efficiency. In particular what are the 
consequences of eliminating unions or passing laws against nepotism? 
We first consider the conceptual experiment of eliminating the union, that is, the 
wage drops to Ww = . Our Pareto analysis runs as follows. Suppose that  * ηη >  so 
that by Theorem 3.1 the employer prefers to employ brothers-in-law, and let  *
2 L  be the 
number of brothers-in-law employed. Suppose instead that the union is eliminated so that 
Ww =  and that a lump sum  *
2 () Ww L −  is taken from the employer and given to the 
brothers-in-law who were formerly employed. The regular employees are indifferent, 
since they get their opportunity wage under either arrangement; the brothers-in-law are 
indifferent since their lump sum gives them exactly what they received with the union. 
Profits to the firm under unionization are  
  ( ) **
22 2 2 2 pq W L W w L β Π =−+ −  
while under competition they are 
  ( ) *
11 1 1 2 pq w L W w L β Π= − + − . 
Consider also the problem of unionization without the brother-in-law, giving profits 
  11 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ pq W L Π= − .   10
We know that  11 1 1 ˆ pq w L Π< − , that is all else equal, raising the wage lowers profits. 
We also know that  *
12 2 2 ˆ pq W L Π> − , since  1 ˆ Π  maximizes that particular function by 
definition, and the brother-in-law solution does not. So we may conclude that 
  12 0 Π− Π> , 
that is, the employer is better off simply paying the brother-in-law and dumping the 
union. 
  Notice, however, that even without the brother-in-law effect, abolishing the union 
would lead to a welfare improvement. So the question arises, is there an additional 
welfare loss from the brother-in-law effect beyond that from unionization itself? To 
answer this, we compute welfare under unionization when nepotism is not allowed, with 
welfare under unionization where brothers-in-law can be hired. Note that this is only 
interesting if the firm chooses to hire brothers-in-law, so that we restrict attention to that 
case. 
A pure welfare analysis does not make much sense here. Banning nepotism makes 
the employer and brothers-in-law worse off, but the normal workers better off. However, 
transfer payments are not neutral, so we should look at a specific welfare criterion. It 
does not make sense, however, to assign equal weight to everyone. In this model, a dollar 
taken from the employer and given to a brother-in-law generates 1 β +  dollars of 
benefits – one dollar to the brother-in-law and β  dollars to the employer. So we would 
conclude that we should simply transfer as much as possible from employer and normal 
workers to brothers-in-law. In particular, competitive equilibrium is not efficient in this 
setup. If we want to work with particular welfare weights, as implicit in the usual 
consumer plus producer surplus shorthand, we should take the weight on the brother-in-
law to be 1 β −  so that transfers to the brother-in-law are welfare neutral. Under these 
weights the perfectly competitive benchmark is efficient.  
Whether banning nepotism is a good or bad idea relative to this welfare criterion 
turns out to depend on the productivity of the brothers-in-law. There are two effects. 
First, the effective cost of labor to the employer is smaller with brothers-in-law, so he 
chooses to increase output if he can hire brothers-in-law. This partially counteracts the 
output-reducing effect of the union. Second, brothers-in-law are less productive and have   11
the same opportunity cost than normal workers, so the social cost of production is higher 
when they are employed. 
First suppose that brothers-in-law are just as productive as normal workers, so 
1 η = . In this case the only consequence of allowing nepotism is a welfare neutral 
transfer from normal workers to brothers-in-law, and an increase in output. This is 
welfare improving, since with the union output is inefficiently low.  
On the other hand, when the productivity of brothers-in-law makes the employer 







output is the same whether normal workers or brothers-in-law are hired, so there is a 
welfare neutral transfer and no welfare improvement from increased output. Banning 
nepotism simply forces the firm to hire the more productive workers instead, increasing 
welfare. 
5. Worker Heterogeneity and the Political Economy of Unions 
  We have assumed that all normal workers are identical. This simplifying 
assumption does not have important economic consequences. To see this, suppose that in 
addition to normal workers, there is a limited supply of “highly productive” workers who 
are more productive than normal workers. If the productivity gap is large enough, highly 
productive workers might not get replaced with brothers-in-law even though normal 
workers do. In other words, the effect of worker heterogeneity is that normal workers are 
gradually replaced as the union wage increases or productivity gap decreases, rather than 
being abruptly replaced. 
  Worker heterogeneity does, however, have political consequences for the union. 
Consider first the case in which normal workers are homogeneous. Suppose that 
1 ηβ ≥−, so that it is possible for brothers-in-law to be hired. From Theorem 3.1, if the 










then the normal workers will be replaced with brothers-in-law. Naturally a union of 
homogeneous normal workers will not choose to set the wage this high. In other words,   12
the presence of brothers-in-law may cause the union to be less aggressive in its demands. 
Notice also that brothers-in-law face no such constraint, and the employer may prefer not 
to have a union of brothers-in-law who will not be so restrained in their wage demands. 
  With heterogeneous normal workers, the situation changes. Again, consider a 
limited supply of “highly productive” workers. If they constitute more than half the work 
force, then they will happily vote the wage high enough that normal workers will be 
replaced by brothers-in-law, but not so high that they will be replaced themselves. In 
general, we would not expect a union subject to majority rule to push the wage so high 
that more than half the work force would be brothers-in-law. In practice then, we are 
likely to see the employment of brothers-in-law, but also that their presence has a 
disciplining effect on union wage demands. 
6. Competition and Informational Rents 
The analysis so far refers to a wage gap created exogenously, for example by a 
union. There are other sources of rents as well.  We turn now to the case of rents 
originated in a moral hazard problem. We consider the traditional principal agent 
problem, with moral hazard and limited liability.
6 We assume that both the firm 
(principal) and worker (agent) are risk neutral. For simplicity, we now assume that a 
single worker will be employed, that there are two levels of effort  { , }   LH ee e ∈  and two 















⎧ ⎪ ⎪ = ⎨ ⎪ − ⎪ ⎩
 
where i indexes the type of worker (normal and brother-in-law) and  1 i η =  for normal 
workers and  1 i ηη =<  for brothers-in-law. 
We assume that output price p is independent of whether  0 q  or  1 q  is produced, 
and is sufficiently high that the principal will choose to produce output – we focus then 
on cost minimization.  
Denote by  , LH ππ respectively the probability of high output for a normal worker 
with a low and high level of effort. High level of effort implies higher probability of 
reaching the high level of output, so  LH ππ < . This is why the principal is interested in 
                                                 
6 See for example Laffont and Martimont (2001) p. 155.   13
implementing  H e . However  H e  has an additional cost for the agent of ψ . Recall that the 
opportunity wage is w . We assume limited liability: the principal cannot pay less than 
w θ ≤  regardless of the level of output. When the employee has no assets, this 
represents the subsistence wage. If the employee has assets, it represents the difference 
between the subsistence wage and his assets, and may be negative if the employee has 
enough assets to live on. 
The model can be summarized in the form of a maximization problem for the 
principal who wants to implement high effort from a type i worker using payment  01 , tt  
when output is low and high respectively. Let  0 i β =  if the normal worker is chosen and 
() 0,1 i ββ =∈  if the brother-in-law is chosen. The maximization problem is: 
 
Maximize over  01 ,, tti  
() () () () () 11 00 1 0 11 iH iH i iH iH qt qt t tw ηπ ηπ β ηπ ηπ ψ −+ − −+ + − − − 
subject to: 
() () 10 1 0 11 iH iH iL iL tt tt ηπ ηπ ψ ηπ ηπ +− −≥ +−  [IC] 
() 10 1 iH iH tt w ηπ ηπ ψ +− −≥   [P] 
0 1, tt θ ≥    [LL] 
 
The employment of brothers-in-law requires that the cost of effort be high relative 
to the gap between the reservation wage and the limited liability wage. In particular, if 
the limited liability constraint does not bind, then the worker earns no rent, and there is 
no incentive to hire the brother-in-law. Specifically, we have the following result on 
employing brothers-in-law: 
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a)  If  ψψ ≤ brothers-in law are never employed, while 
b)  If  ψψ >  and  {} max , ηη η ≥  the firm prefers to hire brothers-in-law instead 
of normal workers. Moreover, if in addition ηη <  the firm induces high effort 
even though it would not without the presence of brothers-in-law. 
Proof:  
a) The incentive constraint [IC] gives us a lower bound for the difference between the 











while the participation constraint [P] gives us a lower limit to the average payment: 
  () 10 1 iH iH tt w ηπ ηπ ψ +− ≥+. 
The solution is to choose  1 t  so that the incentive constraint exactly binds, and choose  0 t  









ψψ .  
In that case the agent is not getting rents so the principal would choose only the most 
productive agents. 
 
b) When ψψ > , it is the limited liability constraint that binds (the participation 
constraint does not), and the solution is  0 t θ =  and 








This solution implies rents to the worker above opportunity cost of 









and with  0 i β =  a profit to the firm of   15







Π= + − − −
−
 
Differentiating this with respect to  i η  we find that – absent any brother-in-law effect,  








=− >  
implying the firm would always prefer to hire the normal worker rather than the brother-
in-law.   
In contrast, when  0 i ββ => , it is easy to see that the optimal contract remains 
the same, but the maximized profit becomes 





ηπ ηπ θ β β ψ θ
ππ
⎛⎞ ⎟ ⎜ +− − − − − +− ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠ −
 
From the comparison of the profit functions for  0 β =  and  1 i η =  with  0 β >  and 
i ηη = , both with high and low effort, we obtain the cutoff points   and  ηη .   
; 
 
Checking that the bounds are not vacuous, take  w θ =  so that the limited liability 
constraint is quite strong, take  0.75, 0.25, 0.5, 0.1 HL ππβ ψ == = =  and suppose that 
10 1 qq −= . Then we can compute  0 , 29/30 , 17/30 ψη η == = , so provided that 
brothers-in-law are relatively efficient – that is  29/30 η > , the employer prefers his 
brother-in-law. Note that if we make the cost of effort ψ  larger, then less efficient 
brothers-in-law will be employed. 
It is interesting to observe that the firm would never want to hire a brother-in-law 
to have him exert low effort. The key intuition to this result lies at the heart of the 
brother-in-law effect: without a wage gap (rent), favoring brothers-in-law is too 
expensive for the entrepreneur.  It is the informational rent what makes it possible to 
prefer brothers-in-law.  Hence, we have: 
Theorem 6.2: If inducing low effort is optimal for the principal, then no brother-in-law is 
hired. 
Proof: Simply observe that the profit with low effort is  10 1 iL iL q+ (- ) q- w ηπ ηπ Π= .  
The strength of the externality β  plays no role in it because there is no wage gap.     
Hence, brothers-in-law have lower productivity and represent no benefit to the firm.   16
; 
One consequence of this result is that to hire brothers-in-law it is necessary that 
their productivity with high effort is higher than that of normal workers with low effort. 
Otherwise it would not be optimal to induce brothers-in-law to exert a high effort, and if 
they exert low effort, the Theorem shows that they will not be employed. Note also that 
brothers-in-law are paid more in the high-output state than normal workers. This is 
necessary if they are to exert high effort, because the difference in the probability of 
getting the high pay, between high and low effort, is smaller than the one of normal 
workers.  Their expected wage is, however, the same. 
Similar results are obtained when output is not verifiable and the game between 
employer and employee is repeated. In this case the underlying moral hazard problem 
leads to an efficiency wage of the type considered in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1982) in which 
the employee is paid a premium so that being fired represents a punishment. 
7. Informational Rents and Efficiency 
  In a principal-agent model the utility of the principal is always maximized subject 
to the constraints of the problem. In the usual case – no choice of whether to employ 
brothers-in-law, in this risk neutral setting, maximizing the principal’s utility could 
induce the agent to exert low effort when high effort is socially optimal.  
  With the welfare weight under which transfer payments are neutral – one for the 
principal and normal worker, and 1 β −  for the brothers-in-law, the situation changes. 
Here the employment of brothers-in-law involves a transfer payment – but that is by 
assumption welfare neutral. In addition, an efficient normal worker is replaced by an 
inefficient brother-in-law leading to a reduction in expected output at the same social cost 
of employing the one worker. However, banning nepotism is not always a good idea. 
Since it is cheaper to motivate brothers-in-law to induce high effort – again on account of 
their non-pecuniary benefit – the firm will induce high effort hiring a brother-in-law in 
cases where would induce low effort with a normal worker. Hence banning nepotism will 
switch the effort reducing welfare. In this case this effect will always more than offset the 
effect of replacing an inefficient worker with an efficient one, and welfare will decline. 
This is because the principal always has the option to hire a normal worker –
implementing low effort – and getting all the surplus. If he decides, instead, to hire a   17
brother-in-law –implementing high effort- his utility cannot be lower and the brother-in-
law is better off. The fact that the brother-in-law is only hired to provide high effort is 
interesting as well: it appears that the stereotype of the lazy brother-in-law who does little 
or no work is not the consequence of moral hazard. 
8. Conclusion 
Competition in the labor market prevents nepotism. When there are labor market 
frictions – either due to unionization or informational rents, we have shown how 
nepotism can lead to an x-inefficiency resulting in lower output per worker. Strikingly, 
the inefficiency in per worker productivity that occurs if unionization is combined with 
nepotism can also be accompanied by an increase in employment over the competitive 
level.  
Note that nepotism can only induce over-employment when the marginal worker 
is a brother-in-law. If there were few brothers-in-law and all were already employed, the 
marginal worker would not be a brother-in-law and nepotism would not increase output: 
it would just be a replacement of efficient workers by inefficient ones. The number of 
available brothers-in-law has to be large for over-employment to occur, so it naturally 
applies better to political party comrades than family members or friends. Political parties 
are typically much larger than regular companies. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that 
every division manager may well be partly paid through some hiring control, so that the 
organization is filled with brothers-in-law – just not the owner’s or the CEO’s, but those 
of the set of executives with some power to hire.  
It is interesting to observe that the phenomenon of nepotism can also arise as part 
of an optimal delegation contract.  Suppose the owner does not have a brother-in-law, but 
the manager does.  Two contracts could be written between them: (1) paying the manager 
an amount of money slightly over his reservation wage, or (2) compensating him with 
less money, but giving him the power to hire his own brothers-in-law. The second 
contract may be preferred, since it may be cheaper for the firm.  Hence, nepotism is not 
necessarily something that the principal would want to fight, provided that the labor 
market has a previous distortion.  
Rent-driven nepotism, what we call the brother-in-law effect, is certainly not 
restricted to the labor market, but extends to any market or economic activity where there   18
are rents that cannot be appropriated directly, for instance, those created by the 
government when setting prices at non competitive levels or by some other means.  Rent 
control, import quotas, preferential rate loans, and public notaries in civil law countries 
come to mind.   19
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